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11 Introduction
The behaviour of the stock markets at the end of the 1990’s has been the ob-
ject of a long and lively debate. High volatility and abnormal capital gains,
specially in hi-tech sectors, have successfully attracted for a few years an in-
creasing number of …nancial investors. The assumption of market e¢ciency
has been questioned by many empirical studies, following, in particular, the
literature on ”excess volatility” (Shiller, 1989), while other empirical contri-
butions, concerned with the interaction between managers and shareholders,
provide evidence on the fact that …rms tend to accumulate cash windfalls
without distributing them to shareholders (Blanchard et al., 1994) showing
that the . Along these lines, the data reported in Blanchard (1993) showed
that thedividend-price ratio hadfallenconstantly and substantially since the
late 1970’s, independently onthe interest rateon bonds; Shiller’s (2000) best-
seller, named after the famous statement by Alan Greenspan, after showing
data on the complete absence of correlation between the increasing trend of
the U.S. stock market at the end of the 1990’s and the pro…ts of the …rms in
the same period, provides a number of explanation based on ”non-economic”
factors a¤ecting the ”irrational” investment choices of millions of individu-
als. Miller et al. (2002) provide a sophisticated explanation of the incredible
value reached by the U.S. stock at the end of 1998 (over 13 billion dollars,
i.e. twice the U.S. GDP and half of the world GDP) based on moral hazard
induced into the …nancial investors by ”jumps” in the expected attitude of
the U.S. Central Banker.
Leaving aside the well-known controversies on how to interpret the be-
haviour of the highly volatile stock market indices of the last decade, two
issues are taken into account in this paper. First, how to provide a rational
explanationto the questionof why do …rm tend to accumulate cash windfalls.
In particular, is there a connection between the allocation of cash windfalls,
stock price, dividend policy and real investment decisions? Second, how
2could we modify our standard investment model in order to account for the
empirical evidence of a large part of developed economies (for instance in
Continental Europe) are still characterized by ”bank-oriented” …nancial sys-
tems (see, in this regard, Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999, Schmidt, 1999, Allen
and Gale, 2000) where hostile takeovers are rather rare, the control of large
…rms is often sold through private negotiations among controlling groups
and, as a consequence, the market for shares is not necessarily associate to
the market for …rms’ control?
Of course, any view in this regard depends on what are one’s opinion
about market e¢ciency, in particular, whether or not share prices re‡ect
the net present value of dividends, whether or not dividend payments adjust
completely to changes in the ‡ow of pro…ts. Any hypothesis on the relation
between stock prices and pro…ts should (at least implicitly) rely on some
assumptions concerning the di¤usion of information about the pro…ts and
the pro…tability of the …rm.
Kurz’s (1994a, 1994b) ”rational belief” theory provides an alternative no-
tion of rationality vis à vis the conventional rational expectations approach.
His theory is based on the consideration that individuals cannot possibly
have structural knowledge of the data generating processes because a rele-
vant part of uncertainty about the future is determined by the joint actions
of other individuals: in this sense Kurz criticizes the conventional way of
formalizing uncertainty by means of exogenous random shocks, since most
of the uncertainty is actually endogenously determined by agents’ future be-
haviour. Kurz (1994a) contains a theorem showing that when agents do
not have structural knowledge and one uses only statistical regularity as a
foundation for a rational theory of belief, the objective rationality criteria
can only provide some asymptotic restrictions on the possibly ”true” model
consistent with observable data. This means that there is a whole set of sig-
ni…cantly di¤erent theories completely consistent with the data, even if one
put no restrictions whatsoever on the agents’ ability to collect and process
3data. The selection by each agent of a particular theory among all those
consistent with the data must necessarily be based on subjective criteria (in
Kurz’s terminology, individual theories about the environment). In Kurz’s
views, one could identify a society by the ”distribution of beliefs” and such
distributions can be as important as the distributions of preferences for the
explanation of economic performance.
Beltratti and Kurz (1996) showthat the rational belief theory canexplain
(both theoretically and empirically) the so-called equity premium puzzle,
by taking into account the endogenous propagation of expectations, in a
mathematical formalization of Keynes’ beauty context.
In this paper, we take the ”critical” view on stock market e¢ciency ex-
pressed in the above-mentioned contributions andassume that the behaviour
of the …rm’s share prices may substantially diverge, at least in the short run,
from that implied by the net present value of future dividends. This a¤ects
the dividend policy and the …nancial decisions of the …rm in a context where
the …rm chooses its investments and …nancial structure simultanously and
the managers hold the control of the …rm and decide upon the allocation of
the internally generated cash-‡ow.
The relevance of the …rm’s …nancial structure for investments has been
the object of a great deal of contributions in macroeconomics and monetary
economics (after the seminal contribution by Fazzari et al., 1988), industrial
economics (for instance, withinthe literature on the”deeppocket argument”,
by Telser, 1966, Benoît, 1984, and Poitervin, 1989a and within the literature
on the ”limited liability e¤ect”, by Brander and Lewis, 1985 and Poitervin
1989b) and, obviously, …nancial economics. However, modellingsimultaneous
decisions of investment and …nancial structure in an intertemporal context
is still controversial. In the conventional ”principal-agent” problem between
managers and shareholders it is common to assume that the managers enjoy
some discretional power in allocating the internally generated cash-‡ow; if
we further admit that in an imperfectly competitive framework a …rm might
4have incentive not to reveal the amount of pro…ts associated to with acertain
level of physical capital, we might turn out to have some di¢culty inde…ning
the concept of expected pro…ts generated by the newly installed capital1.
In a world of …nancial market imperfections, where, due to information
asymmetries, the internally generated cash-‡ow constitutes a cheaper source
of …nance than borrowing and issuing new shares, the behaviour of the share
price and capital gains may a¤ect the dividend policy of the management,
which, again, a¤ects the …rm’s …nancial structure by determining the rate of
pro…ts retention, which, in its turn, determines the volume of investments
…nanced by internal …nance. All that may have relevant implications for the
standard intertemporal investment decision. If the …rm’s …nancial structure
is a¤ected by pro…ts retention and if the cost of …nancial capital is a¤ected
by the …rm’s …nancial structure, then for the intertemporal …rm’s investment
decision, to the extent that the (…rm speci…c) discount factor is a¤ected by
the cost of …nancial capital, a causal link is established between the …rm’s
pro…ts, …nancial structure and discount rate for the future pro…ts.Timing in
the coordination process between …nancial and investment decisions is essen-
tial for the de…nition of ‡ow variables. For this reason we introduce here a
discrete-time optimal control model with a recursive structure, with …nancial
markets imperfections and divergingincentives betweenthe management and
the external shareholders.
The next section contains the description of the model, section 3 contains
a solution approach and the last section contains a few concluding remarks.
1Several examples on how di¤erent individuals might attribute di¤erent value and prof-
itability to capital goods are provided by the literature on contracts and …rm’s …nancial
structure à la Grossman, Hart and Moore. In this regard, see, for instance, Hart (1995).
52 The model
In this model …nancial and real investment decisions take place simultane-
ously. The goods market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive, although
perfect competition canbe aparticular case. On the basis of the assumptions
summarized in the previous section, the management is assumed to be able
to decide how to allocate the …rm’s cash ‡ow, once the creditors are repaid
and the shareholders have been remunerated consistently with a yield wichi
depends on the average market yield on shares. The average market yield
on shares will, of course, in‡uence the remuneration that the owners expect
from their …nancial investments, but, given that the managers are assumed
to fully control the …rm and the allocation of its cash-‡ow, the actual amount
of dividends paid out to the shareholders is the result of an implicit nego-
tiation between management and external shareholders: it can be a¤ected
by a number of factors, in general related to the existing relation between
management and external shareholders. In particular, the management may
or may not have incentive to reveal information on the …rm’s pro…tability.
If so, the stock price might not react (at least in the short run) to changes
in the …rm’s pro…tability. On the other hand, if we allow for the possibility
(at least in the short run) of speculative bubbles, and if we admit that in
the short run the share price might overshoot with respect to its theoretical
level impied by the net present value of the future pro…ts, we must include
this fact in the rational …nancial choice of the management.
We therefore assume, more generically, that the management pay out an
amount of dividends consistent with a share remuneration assumed to be a
function of the (exogenously given) market yield on shares, which, in the
short run, as we said, is to be a¤ected by a number of factors not necessarily
correlated to the actual pro…ts of the …rm and, therefore, is not under the
direct control of the managers. For instance, if the …rm’s shares experience a
positive bubble characterized by persistent abormal capital gains, the man-
6agement probably needs to pay less dividends in order to keep the external
shareholders happy and remunerate them at a satisfactory yield. Having
assumed that the …nancial and real investment decisions take place simulta-
neously, the point is: in which way (given imperfect …nancial markets and
diverging incentives between managers and external shareholders) does the
share price a¤ect dividend policy, pro…t retention, risk premium on external
…nance and hence real investments?
The model is formalized with the optimal control approach, in order to
explicitly refer to the standard investment model and emphasize how di¤er-
ent can be the results by simply introducing some common assumptions of
…nancial market imperfections, diverging incentives between managers and
shareholders, when the share market is not necessarily associated to the mar-
ket for control. In order to take into account the relevance of timing in real
and…nancial decisions (which cannot really be fully capturedin detali within
an optimal control model in continuous time) we introduce here a recursive
structure in the intertemporal problem of the …rm’s investments.
The capital is installed at time t¡ 1, and is …nanced with the …nancial
sources raised by the …rm at time t-1 with a contract establishing also the
debt remuneration at time t: The investment decisions, the production pro-
cess (generating the pro…ts ¼t) as well as the payment of the interests on
borrowed capital and the dividends on the own capital take place at time t .
©¤
t¡1 is the weighted average of the cost of own capital and borrower capital,
established at time t¡ 1 and paid at time t.2
We assume that the time horizon of the decision makers (the manage-
ment) corresponds to their expected residual time m in power at the com-
pany. 3
2For the discrete time extension and applicability of Pontryagin maximum principle
with …nite time horizon, see Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, pp. 207-210 and pp. 370-377)
and Tu (1991).
3This assumption is actually as arbitrary as assuming that the time horizon is in…nite.

























is de…ned as the (strictly concave) maximum value func-
tion, conditional on the parameter º (describing the market structure and
the competitive environment) and on the labour costs !l. In what follows
we assume º and !l to be given and will omit them in the rest of the paper.4
kt¡1 is the capital installed at time t¡ 1, It is the amount of investments
(decided at time t that will contribute to determine the stock of capital at
time t+ 1)
The maximand 1 is subject to the following constraints 2, 3, 4:
It = kt ¡ (1¡ ±)kt¡1 (2)
¼t(kt¡1)¡ ©¤
t¡1kt¡1+ ¢Bt + ¢Et = It (3)
with 0 < ± < 1 and where
Bt represents the borrowed …nance (and, of course, ¢Bt = Bt ¡ Bt¡1)
Et represents the existing stock of the …rm’s shares, valued at their issue
price
± is the rate of capital depreciation.
The non-distributed pro…ts can be interpreted - loosely speaking - as
…nancial reserves accumulated inside the …rm and are de…ned as follows
4To justify this sort of ”ceteri paribus” assumption we can think of a labour market
characterized by a simpli…ed ”e¢ciency wages” mechanism, where wages and employment
are …xed in the short run and are mainly a¤ected by macroeconomic factors
8¼t (kt¡1) ¡ ©¤
t¡1kt¡1 = Wt:
We de…ne the newly borrowed …nance as ¢Bt = Bt ¡ Bt¡1 = Xt
3 is a ‡ow-of-funds condition saying that the new investments Itcan be
…nanced either by issuing new shares, or by borrowing money or with the
residual cash ‡ow which is left after remunerating the …nancial capital (em-
ployed to …nance the physical capital kt).
The latter is de…ned as the weighted average of borrowing and non-
distributed pro…ts (i.e. pro…ts in excess of the dividends that the …rms pays
out to remunerate the shareholders at the exogenously determined yield rs
t).
For the purpose of our model we rule out the case of new shares issue, i.e.
we consider the case where the time path and (exogenously given) variation
of the share price and dividends is such that ¢E0 = 0. 5
Therefore, we rewrite 3 as follows:
5Introducing the possibility for the …rm to issue new shares would not have modi…ed
the qualitative meaning of our analysis. For instance, if we de…ne r¤
s;t as the yield on
the …rm’s share at time t; ps;t the share price, ¢ps;t its variation with respect to time
t ¡ 1;Nt the number of existing shares, we could interpret the situation where the …rm
issues new shares as the case where, given D = r¤
s;t ¢ps;t¢ Nt ¡ ¢ps;t¢ Nt, we have ¢ps;t¢
Nt > r¤
s;t¢ps;t¢ Nt, i.e. a case of ”negative dividends (like in Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988,
1990) generated by an extremely favorable valuation of the …rm by the market, which
makes extremely convenient for the management to raise risk capital.
9¼t (kt¡1) ¡ ©¤
t¡1kt¡1 + Xt = It 3’
Furthermore, ©¤















t is the risk-free interest rate, Á(¹t) is the risk premium on the
interest rate on the …rm’s borrowing, which is assumed to be a monotonically
increasing function of the gearing ratio ¹t = Bt=kt.
©¤
t represents here the minimum value function of the …rm’s …nancial cost
minimization problem.
At every time t the …rm is optimizing its …nancial structure by choosing
the optimal gearing ratio ¹t = Bt=kt that minimizes the cost of …nancial cap-
ital, de…ned as the weighted average between the borrowedandthe internally
generated …nance. ©¤
t obviously represents the rate at which the …rm can
raise external …nance for its investments and transfers resources from time t
to time t+ 1 .
The optimized …nancial structure determines the rate of discount appear-
ing in the intertemporal problem, which is conditional on the ‡ow of non-
distributed pro…ts of the previous period. In this way the ”…rm-speci…c”
rate of discount is recursively determined as a function of the lagged stock
of physical capital and lagged cost of …nancial capital6.
6The idea of simultaneous optimization of the …rm’s …nancial structure (determining
the rate of discount of future pro…ts) was …rst introduced by Bernstein and Nadiri (1986)
within a continuous time optimal control model, and in a di¤erent context from the one
analyzed here, since they assumed no agency problem between the shareholders and the
management and no distinction between the controling group and the externalshareholders
which implies that the management is maximizing the expected wealth of the generical
shareholders.











s;t ¢ ps;t ¢ Nt ¡¢ps;t ¢ Nt (6)
where
r¤
s;t is the yield on the …rm’s shares at time t,
ps;t is the share price, ¢ps;t its variation with respect to time t¡ 1,
Nt is the number of existing shares.
In other words, given the share price, the short run capital gain and
the (exogenous) yield r¤
s;t that the management allow for the shareholders,
we determine the amount of dividends paid out. In this regard, we could
have two possible situations: the …rst (and extreme) one is the standard
neoclassical investment model; the second one corresponds to the situation
where the management strictly pays out an amount of dividends consistent
with the market yield on shares and the share price might not always re‡ect
(in the short run) the net present value of the future pro…ts.
In order to have the standard neoclassical investment model with e¢cient
…nancial markets:
a) share prices adjust perfectly and instantaneously to the value implied
by the pro…ts;
b) cash ‡ow (net of adjustment costs of investments) are entirely ex-
hausted into interests and dividends payments (i.e., no agency problem and
11no incentive for the managers to keep the cash ‡ow - as far as possible given
the yield on shares - inside the …rm).
In all the other cases, the stock price may diverge, in the short run, from
the value implied by the net present value of the future pro…ts. This is what
we are assuming in the rest of the paper.
If stock prices were to be a¤ected by the endogenous propagation of ex-
pectations (like, for instance, in Kurz’s ”Rational Beliefs” theory) , then the
share price would be subject to a number of shocks and show a path appar-
ently uncorrelated (or only very weakly correlated) in the short run to the
actual pro…ts.
In order to explain the ”irrational exuberance” of some years ago, many
mainstream authors (like, for instance, Miller, Weller and Zhang, 2002) had
to invoke some sort of long lasting bubble in order to justify the puzzle of
the Nasdaq index in 1996-2001: in this context again stock prices would be
- in the ”short run” - exogenous with respect to the ”real” pro…ts, although
the ”short run” would be in this case, as short as a decade.
As we said, we take Kurz’s skeptical view on …nancial markets e¢ciency
and admit that stock prices may diverge (although under very particular
conditions, such as those witnessed by the Nasdaq index in the last decade)
from the value implied by the …rms pro…ts. In particular, it is possible that
the share price in the short run is potentially a¤ected by persistent bubbles
or even a¤ected by the incentives of the managers to keep the cash-‡ow as
much as possible inside the …rm. The managers might not have incentives to
fully reveal all the information on the …rm’s pro…tability and they tend not
to exhaust pro…ts into dividends and interest payments.
Under these assumptions, we can allow ourselves to think of the share
price as exogenously determined in the short run. Given the share price and
its short runcapital gain, the management ofthe …rmchoose ayield r¤
s;twhich
determine the amount of dividends they want to pay to the shareholders. r¤
s;t
could be interpreted as a …nancial market constraint on the behaviour of
12the management: it represents the remuneration that keeps the shareholders
happy. It couldbe interpreted as the result ofanimplicit negotiationbetween
the shareholders and the management, with asymmetric information.





ps;t ;while for the management the cost of capital is a¤ected by
the (exogenous) book value p0;t ¢ Nt of the shares. Hoever, for a given (and
exogenous) value of
¢ps;t
ps;t , it is easy to verify that if it were subject to shocks,
these shocks would have an impact on the dividend policy and, as a con-
sequence, on the …rm’s …nancial structure and investment decisions. Note
that, due to the assumptions made here about the insiders’ control of the
cash-‡ow, once the shares have been issued, their market value is relevant to
the managers only to the extent that it contributes to the determination of
their dividend policy. For this reason, the notation ¢Et and Et is di¤erent
from the notation employed to indicate the value of the newly issued shares.
The above assumptions generate not only a recursive structure in the
problem but also a certain persistence of the past pro…ts in‡uence on the
discount rate. The extent of this persistence is implicitly limited by the rate
of capital depreciation ±:
Since the internally generated …nance is pre-determined (by the non-
distributed pro…ts at time "t ¡ 1"), by choosing the value Xt of the newly
borrowed …nance, the …rm also determine the maximum amount of feasible
new investments at time "t" and the gearing ratio at time "t", which will
be incorporated in the new debt contracts that the …rm issues in order to
…nance part of its investments.
Let us now analyse the minimum value function ©¤
t: Assuming that the





t + Á(¹t)+ ¹tÁ
0(¹t) ¡ it = 0
The above equation (stating that in equilibrium the marginal cost of
13borrowing equals the marginal cost of the internally generated …nance) can
be simpli…ed by assuming that »(¹t) = Á(¹t) + ¹tÁ
0(¹t) can be rearranged
into a monotonically increasing and invertible function of ¹t. One can easily
verify that this would be always true if Á(¹t) is convex7 in ¹t , as we are
actually assuming in this model.





This means, inother words, that the gearing ratioisanincreasingfunction
of the di¤erence between the cost of own capital it and the interest rate
on risk-free assets r
f
t, since, for a given r
f
t , the higher is the cost of own
capital, the higher is the incentive for the …rm to borrow by increasing the
gearing ratio. At each time the managers, by choosing the level of debt,
simultaneously a¤ect the investments (i.e. the control variable), the …nancial
structure and the cost of …nance
By looking at the constraints 2 and 3’, one immediately sees that they
both are dynamic equations putting into relation two ‡ow variables (It and
Xt) with the state variable k at two di¤erent moments in time.(t¡1 and t).
Inparticular, whileIt relatesthe statevariables kt¡1 andkt for agivenrate
of discount ©¤
t;Xt does the same job and in addition determines (together
with kt ) the optimal rate of discount. In other words, di¤erently from the
7This would be true also if Á (¹t) were concave but with a second derivative su¢ciently
small in absolute value, i.e. if its curvature is ”relatively ‡at”. However the assumption
of convexity for Á(¹t) is rather general, since it could capture the situation where highly
indebted …rms would have to pay an extremely high risk premium on borrowed capital.
Furthermore, if the analytical form of Á(¹t) were such that it tended asymptotically
to in…nite when ¹t approaches 1, one could reproduce the case of credit rationing by
introducing appropriate analytical form and parameters for the function Á(¹t):
14conventional neoclassical intertemporal investment models, it is not It but
Xt that acts as a control variable in this context.
Since we know from 3’ that ¼t (kt¡1) ¡ It = ©¤
t¡1kt¡1 ¡ Xt , we may
express 1 in terms of the control variable Xt and the state variable kt¡1 ,
while by putting together the two constraints 3’ and 2 we can eliminate It
and express the intertemporal constraints too in terms of Xt . Therefore the
…rm’s problem can be rede…ned as follows:
Vt = (©¤












kt = (1 ¡ ±)kt¡1 + ¼t(kt¡1)¡ ©¤
t¡1kt¡1 +Xt
if one allowed for shocks in the pro…t function ¼t , for instance, by letting
º be subject to shocks, these shocks would be transferred to the rate of
discount of the future pro…ts from the next period on. In addition, as we can
see again from 5, 7 and 4, the …rm’s discount rate is a¤ected by the share
price and in its variations. In other words, a …nancial shock modifying the
optimal dividend policy of the …rm’s managers would also modify the cost of
own capital, the optimal gearing ratio, and, as a consequence, the discount
rate. Of course, the speci…c nature of these causal links would depend on the
nature of the connections between ¼ and p, i..e. how e¢cient is the …nancial
market and how fast does the information process go.
3 A slightly unconventional result
We are now enabled to write down the discrete Hamiltonian as follows:
15Ht = (©¤

























The de…nition for it allows us to clarify the link betweenpro…ts, informa-
tion spreading, share price and dividend policy. For instance, if the managers
do not have incentives to reveal information on the pro…tability of the …rm,
the share price might not react (at least in the short run) to increases in the
pro…ts. Therefore the numerator of it would not change and the denom-
inator would increase. This means that an increase in ¼i(ki¡1) would be
associated to a reduction in the cost of the own capital and, hence, on the
average cost of capital.
On the other hand, if an increase in the …rm’s pro…tability determine an
increasing and persistent capital gain, the numerator of it would be small
again: inotherwords, the owncapital wouldbecome relatively cheap (as long
as ¢ps;t increases) since, due to the capital gains, the management needs to
pay less dividends to the external shareholders in order to keep them happy.
Given the assumptions we made on the cost of the own capital and divi-
dends determination, any shock to the exogenous share price would be trans-
ferred to the dividends and hence to it and the optimal …nancial structure ¹,
which determines (through 7) the rate of discount of future pro…ts. In other
words, by substituting , 5, 6 and 7 into 4, ©¤











16Assuming now that the regularity conditions for Ht are satis…ed, an easy
and straightforward application of TU (1991, pp. 261-264) de…nition of the
”Discrete Maximum Principle” yields the following results:
@Ht
@Xt






























































The left-hand side of 10 is, of course, the marginal pro…tability of capital,
net of the rate of depreciation of k. The right-hand side of 10 is composed
of three addends, one for each row. The …rst one can be thought of as the
e¤ect of how the modi…cations in the discount rate generated by a change in
the state variable a¤ect the way the future values of the net …nancial ‡ows
(©¤
tkt ¡ Xt) are discounted.
The second addend (second row) describes how again the same modi…-
cations in the discount rate modify the ‡ow of dividends and interest rates
that have to be paid on the future capital kt (which, given the balance sheet
constraint of the …rm, is equal to the …nancial capital Bt + Rt ) .
17The third addend (third row) jointly represents the two above-mentioned
e¤ects for the remaining future periods.
The intuitive interpretation of all that goes as follows: …rst, any shock
to the pro…t function on the left-hand side of the above equation (i.e. any
shock a¤ecting the functional link between pro…ts and capital, such as tech-
nology shocks, but also shocks in the market structure or in the degree of
competition among …rms) is propagated to the cost of …nancial capital, and,
therefore, to the rate of discount of future pro…ts, the …rst addend on the
right-hand side of the above equation. This happens because in imperfect
…nancial markets, the cost at which the management is able to raise funds is
bound to be a¤ected by the risk premium and by the cash-‡ow. The conven-
tional neoclassical investment models, where the discount rate is …xed and
exogenous, miss the potential causal link between cash-‡ow, risk premium
cost of …nance and rate of discount of future pro…ts. In this sense they might
not be the more appropriate tool to analyse investment decisions with …nan-
cial market imperfections where the managers control the …rm’s cash-‡ow
and have incentive not to disclose all the information on cash-‡ow.
In addition, the converse is also true: any (exogenous in this framework)
shock to the discount rate (caused, for instance, by a speculative bubble in-
creasing the share price) a¤ects the cost of external …nance (since the man-
ager need to pay less dividends to the shareholders in order to keep them
happy) and hence the rate of discount, by increasing the right-hand side
of the above equation. All this brings about a movement along the opti-
mal point in the …rm’s pro…t function, i.e. a modi…cation in the marginal
pro…tability of capital, in the left-hand side of the above equation.










































































The expression It + (1+ ©¤
t)kt might be interpreted as the total capital
absorption (i.e. capital stock plus investments) plus capital remuneration
at time t. Since the marginal pro…tability of capital associates a change in
pro…ts to a change in the stock of capital, the …rst line of 11 contains the



















t) is the present value
of the di¤erence between pro…ts at time t+1 and capital absorption and
remuneration at time t+1
11 allows us to interpret and decompose the marginal pro…tability of








is theimpactof the …rm’s wealthontherisk premium and
hence on the capital cost. Therefore the marginal pro…tabiliy of capital (net



















t) as well as their future net present discounted values.
Loosely speaking, 11 could be interpreted as a link between the marginal
pro…tability of the capital and the …nancial value of the …rm. In other words
MARGINAL PROFITABILITY OF CAPITAL (NET OF THE RATE
OF DEPRECIATION)
=
19FUTURE DISCOUNTED VALUE OF THE FOLLOWING:
IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE FIRM’S FINANCIAL
RESERVES ON CAPITAL COST
times
CHANGES IN THE FIRM’S RESERVES FINANCIAL , i.e. DIFFER-
ENCE BETWEEN CASH FLOW AND CAPITAL ABSORPTION AND
REMUNERATION
times
SPREAD BETWEENMAGINALPROFITABILITY OF CAPITAL AND
AVERAGE COST OF EXTERNAL CAPITAL
This means that the part of marginal pro…tability of capital which is not
paid out by the management as remuneration for the shares and debt, has
an impact on the …rm’s …nancial reserves, and hence on the discount rate of
future pro…ts and on the value of the …rm.
Theapproachand results presented here slightly diverge from the conven-
tional neoclassical optimal control investment modelbecause the assumptions
made on the control of the cash-‡ow by the managers, the fact that market
for shares is not necessarily associated with the market for the …rm’s control,
and, …nally, …nancial market imperfections (and imperfect adjustment of the
share price to the value implied by the discounted future pro…ts) introduce a
causal link between the ‡ow of pro…ts, the …rm’s …nancial structure and the
rate of discount of the future ‡ows of pro…t. This can be interpreted as an
”inside the …rm” channel of transmission of …nacnial shocks to the real in-
vestments. This link between the real and the …nancial side of the economy
and its underlying idea is broadly consistent with the ”excess sensitivity”
empirical literature à la Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
20This framework could also help to explain some recent empirical results
claiming that including appropriate measures for stock market yields and
capital gains would make internal cash ‡ow statistically non signi…cant in in-
vestments regressions based on …rms panel data (for instance, Gomes, 2001).
In fact, to the extent that both current pro…ts and stock prices simultane-
ously contribute to determine the (endogenous) rate of discount of future
pro…ts, they could turn out to be statistically co-determined and simulta-
neously correlated with the investments through the …rm speci…c rate of
discount of future pro…ts. If the …rms enjoys a long period of high pro…ts
and its stock price overshoots (like in the excess volatility case à la Shiller)
with respect to the value implied by the pro…ts, so that the …rms experiences
a persistent long period of increasing capital gains (like in the ”irrational
exuberance” case) the results gets even stronger. In other words, an increas-
ingly overvalued share price makes the internally generated …nance cheaper
because it allows the managers to pay out less dividends (and keep the share-
holders satis…ed, since they are remunerated by the capital gain). This could
contribute to explain why some recent empirical analyses (like Gomes, 2001)
…nd out that introducing in an investment regression appropriate measures
for the stock market prices seem to reduce the statistical signi…cance of the
internally generated csh-‡ow
4 Concluding remarks
The simple qualitative framework considered here describes the simultane-
ous decisions of …rm’s investments and …nancial structure, in a context of
discrete-time dynamic optimization with imperfect …nancial markets where
management hold the control of the …rm, decide upon the allocation of the
…rm’s cash-‡ow, and the stock price (due to imperfect information and in-
centive of the manager not to fully reveal their private information on the
21…rm’s pro…tability) may deviate, in the short run, from the value implied by
the discounted future dividends. The simultaneous optimization of the …rm
investment and …nancial structure determines a link between the cash-‡ow
and the rate of discount of future pro…ts in the intertemporal optimization
problem. All this carries two implications: …rst, any shock in the pro…ts or
in the …rm’s pro…tability has an e¤ect on the …nancial structure of the …rm
and hence on the rate of discount of the future pro…ts; second, an exogenous
shock to the stock market a¤ects the dividend policy, the pro…t retention,
hence the cost of external …nance and the real investments.
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